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‘Nothing will ever be the same again’. Personal
commitment and political subjectivation in the
20 February Movement in Morocco
Francesco Vacchiano and Hafsa Afailal
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
ABSTRACT
Based on an analysis of the stories of engagement of young activists who took
part in the 20 February Movement in Morocco, this contribution explores the
process of individual transformation that occurred during the experience of
activism. We use the concept of political subjectivation to discuss the
succession of moments of rupture and re-semanticisation, the new ethical
conﬁgurations generated by the experience of activism and their long-term
consequences. This contribution is part of an ethnographic study that has
accompanied the evolution of the protests from 2011, carried out by the two
authors ﬁrst independently and, from 2017, within the framework of the
‘Globally Sensitive: Revolt, Citizenship, and Expectations for the Future in
North Africa’ project.
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We need the formation of this insurrectional collective subjectivity for which what
was bearable becomes unbearable […]
How do these ‘same’ become others? What is this transformative energy by which ‘I’,
‘We’ are no longer as before?
Fethi Benslama, Soudain la Révolution!
Introduction
The popular uprisings of 2011, commonly known as the ‘Arab Spring’, have
probably constituted the most substantial topic in scholarship dedicated to
the Middle East and North Africa over the last years. The events preceding
and following the self-immolation of Tāriq Muhammad Al-Bou ‘Azizi have
been scrutinised from a variety of perspectives and their ambiguous out-
comes are still the subject of intense debate. Numerous analyses have
pointed to the combination of state authoritarianism and cronyism as provid-
ing fertile ground for the revolts (Hibou 2006, 2011; Campante and Chor 2012;
Bayart 2013; Bono et al. 2015). Authors have particularly emphasised how, in
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the last thirty years, the traditional strategies of power and resource accumu-
lation have been reformulated within a new neo-liberal agenda, enlarging the
gap between classes and furthering a sense of immobility and frustration in
society (King 2007; Bogaert 2013; Almodóvar 2014; Hanieh 2013; Akçali
2016; Bogaert 2018). The condition of youth has been pivotal in these ana-
lyses, owing both to young people’s representativeness in society and to
their protracted ‘waithood’ in the delayed process of generational transition
(Dhillon, Dyer, and Yousef 2009; Osman 2012; Murphy 2012; Honwana 2013;
Muldering 2013; Shafer 2015; Belghazi and Moudden 2015). Several authors
agree in identifying Middle Eastern youth as a historically speciﬁc ‘sociological
generation’, marked by cultural experiences and ambitions that are relatively
distinct from the past (Desrues 2012; Murphy 2012; Gertel 2017).
Against this backdrop, the combination of capitalistic pressures for
accumulation and self-improvement, together with the reality of uneven
opportunities at home has motivated young – and often very young –
people of lower classes to pursue a possible future in a coveted and distant
elsewhere (Vacchiano 2014, 2018a). This happened before, after and also
during the days of the revolt (Tazzioli 2017). While such factors are commonly
evoked to provide a context for the sudden outburst of protests that occurred
in 2011, numerous authors have discussed the conditions that precipitated
the events, some emphasising the unleashing eﬀect of social media, and
others the role of grass-roots organisations in laying the ground for revolt.
Each of these contributions sheds partial light on the events. Yet, they
mostly explore the historical, political and social dynamics underlying
popular discontent. Whereas structural factors are certainly relevant, they
are not suﬃcient per se to explain people’s disposition to take an active role
in mobilisations. In point of fact, very few scholars have as yet tried to
include subjects’ choices and intimate motivations in their attempts to under-
stand the 2011 revolts (see examples in Abdelrahman 2011 and Benslama
2011). In this contribution we try to retain a sense of the societal factors
behind the 2011 uprisings while giving attention to the individuals involved,
by exploring the ways in which people decided to step forward and make a
personal commitment to political change. By foregrounding ﬁgures, we do
not mean to disregard the background, but instead to study their interdepen-
dence and explore how circumstances inﬂuence choices and, in turn, how
people concur in producing events. For, as compelling as a collective
moment might be for those participating in it, such events are also made
by and through personal stories.
The idea of exploring the 2011 uprisings from this angle came from our
conversations with Moroccan activists, in which they generally agree that
the results of the wave of demonstrations that occurred in 2011 lie well
below expectations. Yet, they also recurrently remark that, despite their disap-
pointment, ‘nothing will ever be the same again’. Now, we could easily dismiss
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this statement as a case of ‘cognitive dissonance’ (the need to justify personal
engagement in terms of rationality and success), a framework that would also
explain why activists are usually more prone to give a positive assessment of
the events (Festinger 1957). However, if we really want to grasp the subjective
meaning of the experience, we are called upon to take this statement
seriously and ask: what has allegedly changed forever? If the common, wide-
spread perception of the events that unfolded after the self-sacriﬁce of Bou
‘Azizi is one of disillusionment, what do protagonists think has been, nonethe-
less, permanently achieved?
By spotlighting individual decision, we aim to observe the ways in which
one comes to undertake a politically informed process of reﬂection and
choice. As we will see, this does not mean that people are necessarily fully
aware of their reasons for (or the consequences of) their actions, but that,
given a certain combination of historical dynamics and events, they can
assume new forms of positioning as a result of a subjective shift. While
there is a long tradition of studies concerning ‘daily resistance’ and ‘tactics’
(De Certeau 1990), ‘infra-politics’ and ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1985, 1990)
and ‘non-movements’ (Bayat 2010), it seems to us that much less has been
written about the moments in which people stop resisting and start revolting
(Thomassen 2012).
Young people are at the core of our analysis. However, youth is not only a
matter of age, but a category characterised by a peculiar federative quality,
one that allows people of diﬀerent ages and walks of life to imagine, if not
a common programme, at least a common condition. In our discussion, it is
pertinent mainly as an ‘emic’ concept, owing to the fact that our interlocutors
liked to use it to imagine themselves in relation to their world.
This contribution results from ethnographic work started in 2011 and
carried out by the two authors in Morocco and Tunisia, ﬁrst separately and,
from 2017, under the common framework of the ‘Globally Sensitive: Revolt,
Citizenship, and Expectations for the Future in North Africa’ research
project, funded by the Portuguese Council for Scientiﬁc Research.1 We met
and, whenever possible, interviewed young activists who participated in the
20 February Movement in Morocco, in order to explore with them their
paths of engagement during and after 2011. Additionally, we recovered
some of the interviews carried out by Hafsa Afailal for the realisation of the
volume 20 February Movement. An Attempt of Documentation, published in
Arabic by the Mediator for Democracy and Human Rights.2 Our goal was to
explore the subjective transformations related to their experience of activism.
We use the concept of ‘political subjectivation’ as a tool that allows us to think,
as we will discuss in the next section, the succession of moments of rupture
and re-semanticisation, the elaboration of new worldviews and new ethical
conﬁgurations related to the experience of political engagement, as well as
their long-term consequences.
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 3
Political subjectivation, or a theory of freedom
In our analysis, we propose to use the concept of ‘political subjectivation’ to
describe the process of individual transformation related to the experiences
in which a new ethical orientation, a new representation of oneself and the
world and a new propensity for engagement and action emerge. In our under-
standing, the concept includes that of ‘political socialization’ insofar as it con-
siders the importance of primary and secondary relations for the maturation
of ethical and political values (Petrovic, van Stekelenburg, and Klandermans
2014). On the one hand, we wish to explore the ways in which our interlocu-
tors came to the decision to act. On the other hand, we analyse the aftermaths
of their choices and their consequences in the long run.
In a perspective that intersects psychoanalysis and poststructuralist anthro-
pology, we consider subjectivation as the endless process in which we
become particular individuals through our relationship with other people,
objects and physical spaces that impose an embodied order of values and
meanings.3 Such an order, incorporated mostly through sensations and
aﬀects and, therefore, largely unconscious, constitutes a relatively predictable
set of orientations, according to which an individual complies with and reacts
to the world. However, due to the multiplicity of forms of being and living in
the world and the ontogenic nature of human experience, this largely unac-
knowledged set of values and meanings is neither coherent nor permanent,
and – to a certain extent – responds to circumstances and changes over time.
For us, subjectivation is therefore the process in which individuals, striving
to deﬁne themselves in relation to the world and their experience of it, elab-
orate new aﬀective and cognitive repertoires in order to orient their action
amidst a series of possible alternatives. In our analysis, subjectivation is ‘pol-
itical’ when personal change emerges in a process in which a speciﬁc vision
of society and collective future is intentionally pursued.
The notion of political subjectivation has been largely employed in political
philosophy, although not always consistently and, at times, without a clear
theorisation of how exactly the subject should be conceptualized. This long
genealogy, which goes from Arendt to Rancière via Foucault, Butler, Laclau,
Deleuze, Žižek and others (recently examined by Tassin 2012 and Tarragoni
2016), focuses speciﬁcally on the process of transformation that is induced
by experience and its potentialities for political change. Despite diﬀerences,
these authors agree that subjectivation is an unﬁnished process of diﬀeren-
tiation and, as such, an opening to a condition of uncertainty. For Hannah
Arendt, the subject is not obliged by his past but must constantly invent it
through a movement of singularisation that makes one ‘other’ and which is
political in the ﬁrst place (Arendt 1958).
This reﬂection ﬁnds an echo in Foucault’s later works, in which subjectiva-
tion is described as a process that is concurrently a subjection to practices of
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sovereignty and a productive possibility of diﬀerence. For Foucault, and for
Butler thereafter, subjection/subjectivation takes on political qualities when
the individuals are transformed into the subjects of their own practice (Fou-
cault 1984; Butler 1997). The act of ‘taking care of oneself’ carries a series of
political implications insofar as it both accomplishes and transforms the
bio-power. Through a series of ‘limit experiences’ (‘experiences-limite’, an
expression borrowed from Blanchot regarding experiences that lie out of
the ordinary), the subject carries out a self-denial and a self-invention (Fou-
cault 1986). The techniques of the self are operations based on a reasoning
about the beautiful, the good, the just and so on whereby the individual is
transformed into an ethical subject (Foucault 1988), that is, one who is able
to use the power ‘for other purposes’ (Olivier 1996, 67). Although Foucault
mostly does not clarify in which sense this process can be considered properly
political, we retain in this idea the transformative potentiality of the act of
reﬂection on and problematisation of the existing.
The subject that emerges out of this process is neither a polished nor a
ﬁnished product, but a set of new contradictory potentialities. The author
who most insists on this ‘negative’ aspect of subjectivation is Jacques Ran-
cière, for whom politics is ﬁrst and foremost a ‘rupture’ (‘désidentiﬁcation’)
that makes it possible to undo the reproductive classiﬁcations of the social
order (Rancière 1995). Rancière’s subject is realised only in its making, when
it is able to remain ‘outsider’ or ‘in-between’ (Rancière 1995, 61), and political
subjectivation is produced mainly through the rejection of a ‘remarkable
subject’ and the pursuit of an ‘indeterminate future without precession or pro-
cession’ (Fjeld and Tassin 2015). In Rancière, political subjectivation is not the
coming to a state (he calls it ‘police’), but an opening to new and unknown
sets of possibilities: ‘a multiple that was not given in the police constitution
of the community’ (Rancière 1995, 60). In short, it is a ‘break’ loaded with
potentialities and unexpected consequences (see also Žižek 2013).
The contributions of this long tradition in political philosophy emphasise
the necessity of considering the individual (and his/her personal transform-
ations) as a fundamental player in the dynamics of political change (Tarragoni
2014). On the one hand, we take inspiration from them to postulate that pol-
itical action is possibly the result of a reasoning in which the subject is consti-
tuted through a process or cognitive and aﬀective reformulation. On the other
hand, we consider that, in much of this scholarship (Laclau 2005; Hardt and
Negri 2005), political organisation takes second place, and politics appears
mostly as the action of a plurality of individuals. Indeed, as also emerges in
our analysis, individuals are transformed primarily through their socialisation
within a community, commonly consisting of organised or semi-organised
groups. For us, focusing on the individual and his/her personal motives
does not mean that political subjectivation is an inner monologue. Personal
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sensibility is converted into a political – that is, collective – project mainly
through the relation with forms of shared thought.
Despite their lack of speciﬁc reﬂections on the forms of organisation and
their structuring impact on the subject, these authors remain relevant
because they make it possible to think of political action as the result of a
process that promotes ‘work on oneself’. Such work consists of a major
ethical shift and, as such, can be analysed through the lenses of a rather
diﬀerent ﬁeld of studies that has emerged in anthropology in recent years
and is dedicated to the theorisation of ethics, morality and freedom. Although
an extensive examination of this vast and growing literature is beyond this
article’s scope, we draw from it some valuable hints. Much of this new scholar-
ship stands out against a Durkheimian, social-deterministic view of society,
opposing in particular the equivalence between social norms and morality
in order to carve out an area of autonomy for the subject and make personal
freedom thinkable (Laidlaw 2002; Widlok 2004; Zigon 2008; Yan 2011). Signiﬁ-
cantly, most of these authors refer to the Foucauldian theorisation on subjec-
tivation as the foundation of the possibility for free choice and liberty. James
Laidlaw, for example, cites Foucault’s deﬁnition of ‘techniques of the self’ to
underline how people’s operations on ‘their own bodies, their own thoughts,
their own souls and their own conduct’ presuppose an ethical project aimed
at making oneself a speciﬁc kind of person (Laidlaw 2002, 322). In such prac-
tices, freedom is ‘exercised’ in forms that are both bound to historically avail-
able possibilities and open to new potentialities (Foucault 1984). For Laidlaw
‘wherever and in so far as people’s conduct is shaped by attempts to make of
themselves a certain kind of person, because it is as such a person that, on
reﬂection, they think they ought to live, to that extent their conduct is
ethical and free’ (Laidlaw 2002, 327). In a similar vein, Joel Robbins suggests
that we consider all actions that derive from a conscious thinking about
oneself and the world as properly ‘moral’ (Robbins 2007). This point is
echoed by Jarret Zigon, who elaborates a sound distinction between ‘moral-
ity’, a practice rooted in non-reﬂexive and unintentional dispositions, and
‘ethics’, a speciﬁc reﬂection on oneself and the circumstances. He draws
from Heidegger a notion commonly translated into English as ‘breakdown’
– in German it is ‘einer Deﬁzienz des besorgenden Zu-tun-habens mit der Welt’
(Heidegger 2006, 61) – to describe the situations in which the usual order
of things, the one characterised by non-reﬂexive behaviours dictated by
habit, is shaken by an interrogation that allows one to question values and
meanings (Zigon 2007). He calls ‘moral breakdown’ the circumstances in
which ‘ethical dilemmas’ arise and demand to take a stand. The author
emphasises the aﬃnity with the Foucauldian concept of ‘problematization’,
very relevant to our reﬂection insofar as Foucault himself deﬁned this
reﬂexive moment as an act of freedom. For Zigon, this ‘ethical moment’ is
not solipsism, but a relational move that responds to a social demand. It is
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also a moment of freedom in which ‘people work on themselves, and in so
doing, alter their very way of being-in-the-world’ (Zigon 2007, 138).
Here again, by insisting on personal self-reﬂection, these authors give the
impression that they prefer to limit the potentialities of ethical reconﬁguration
to the individual. However, it seems to us that the notions of ‘moral break-
down’ and ‘problematization’ open up interesting avenues toward an under-
standing of what kind of moves are at play in the process of political
subjectivation. As we will see in a while, self-reﬂection and ethical reconﬁgura-
tion constitute marking moments in the experiences of political engagement.
In the case of our interlocutors, a proper ‘ethical rupture’, in the sense pro-
posed by Zigon, was at play, and was encouraged by the events and by the
imaginary possibilities they disclosed.
Through the ethical break that accompanies activism (and its related
experiences of estrangement and aﬃliation), the subject realises a form of
life that asserts itself as an example of ‘another possible world’. This experi-
ence of freedom, realised in a suspended time that would remind many
anthropologists of the liminal condition of the ritual described by Van
Gennep (1909) and reworked by Turner (1969), lasts until a new order
imposes a return to the ‘unreﬂective moral dispositions of everyday life’
(Zigon 2007, 135). In the meantime, many things happen until, eventually,
‘nothing will ever be the same again’.
A ‘Movement’ in the proper sense of the term
The narratives of our Moroccan interlocutors – interviewed with the aim of
reconstructing their personal paths to commitment – show recurrently how
the new circumstances resulting from the outbursts of popular rage in
other countries unleashed a speciﬁc interrogation about their own condition,
identity and role in the ‘hot days’ of early 2011.4 Such moments of ‘recog-
nition’ rested on a feeling of commonality produced by the underlying
sense of common identity and opposition to injustice. The exemplum
coming from elsewhere represented for many of them a powerful driver for
a possible transition from everyday indignation to collective action. In
addition, those who had previous experiences of militancy, either personally
or within their household, emphasise how the circumstances imposed a
new kind of reasoning about conditions and possibilities, one which had
the potential to trigger a process of personal transformation.
Redwan, a young man from Rabat with a mild interest in politics and no
previous experience of activism, admitted he was deeply impressed when
the Tunisian President Ben ‘Ali ﬂed his country on 14 January 2011. He calls
it ‘a turning point, the beginning of a new phase’. He started to join some
friends at a café to follow the event on Al Jazeera. He used social networks
to get in touch with ‘dozens of schoolmates’ and receive updates. When he
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was directed to an event planned for 20 February he did not understand ‘who
they are’ but decided, together with his friends, to show up on that day. He
began to join meetings and take an increasingly active role in the organisation
of rallies and other events. Redwan’s narrative emphasises his personal shift
from the sense of helplessness that, according to his words, characterised
the past and his investment in new collective hopes. The step from ‘subjec-
tion’ to ‘participation’ (Almond and Verba 1963) constituted a major subjective
movement, sustained by new forms of political imagination, new languages
and new opportunities for recognition. Nevertheless, for our interlocutors,
this is rarely a passage from nothing to all, but is more often a progression
across diﬀerent forms of feeling and thinking the world.
Sukaina gradually moved closer to politics in 2008, after joining a march for
Palestine. She had moved from a shantytown located in the outskirts of a city
in the North to Rabat to study journalism a few months earlier. Despite the
humble conditions of her household, she had always been an excellent
student and ‘the hope of the family’ for a better future, but she had to
borrow money from uncles to be able to aﬀord to study away from home.
She describes her environment as non-politicised, one in which people com-
monly reiterated the widespread image of the King as ‘a hard worker sur-
rounded by thieves’. At various events on free speech and freedom of the
press organised by students, she came in contact with the representatives
of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights and started to attend meetings
of the Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party (PADS), a left-wing political organ-
isation. She increasingly questioned her upbringing and her values: ‘When I
arrived in Rabat I was a veiled girl, adopting a typical popular Muslim religion
but, as time went on, my way of thinking began to change’. She speaks of ‘a
revolution against the values and uses that I had acquired’, by moving ‘from
popular Islam to [the condition of] a young layman who believes in diﬀerence
and tolerance, individual freedoms, and freedom of belief’. Taking advantage
of distance, she kept this change hidden from her family for almost two years.
On 20 February she gave an interview for a national TV station and went on
air. She considers that she belongs to ‘the class that had to take to the
street’, feeling ‘compelled to go out to manifest and claim for change and
social equity’. For her, the 2011 Movement was an ‘opportunity that should
not be missed’, in part because of the favourable regional and international
environment.
‘Adil, a young worker from Rabat, concedes he was aware of the existence
of ‘corruption’ ( fasād) in society, but was passively accustomed to it: ‘That’s
just the way it is’. He half-heartedly joined the rally on 20 February, but
realised the slogans chanted by the growing crowd were in tune with his feel-
ings. He kept on attending rallies without taking up a more active role within
the Movement. According to him, this attitude lasted until the day when he
was heavily beaten by the police during a sit-in. This event ‘disclosed for
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the ﬁrst time a diﬀerent aspect of politics’, becoming a marking episode, a
turning point in his militancy, which became more intense thereafter. In
his testimony, ‘Adil highlights his sense of helplessness in the face of ‘corrup-
tion’ and the sudden recognition of the connection between his unarticu-
lated feelings and the keywords of the Movement. For him, this move of
identiﬁcation was a ﬁrst step on the path leading from private indignation
to public commitment. Similarly to other activists, exposure to violence
marked for him the passage to a further stage. Violence, especially that
which comes from the makhzen,5 is often described by activists as the
crossing of a new boundary, leading to a deeper awareness of the power
relations within society. Repression unleashes its productive potential, contri-
buting to materialising the contradictions inherent in society and make them
dramatically concrete.
Hayat grew up in Tetouan, in a working class neighbourhood stigmatised
because of its reputation for violence and religious extremism. She dropped
out of school early to work with her family ‘at the diwāna’, a vernacular
expression that alludes to the carriers of undeclared goods across the
border of Ceuta (Vacchiano 2013). On 20 February she ‘went downtown’
with some neighbours connected to the Islamist organisation Al-‘Adl wa al-
Ihsān. She explains it is not necessary to be an activist ‘to say no’, as everybody
was ‘tired of hogra’.6 Although, as she says, at home they were rather used to
living ‘hda l-hit’ (ﬂanking the wall), she is now convinced that ‘people can
change the situation’ (ash-sha‘b yemken ghayyar al-wad‘iya). Although her
parents are worried for the consequences she might run into, she knows
that, in the end, they know she is right.
Living ‘Hda l-hit’ means to avoid problems, especially with the authorities,
to keep a cautious discretion and, most of all, to refrain from protesting. It is an
attitude of deference and avoidance that disguises the ‘tiredness of life’ in
order to get by under an authoritarian regime marked by heightened surveil-
lance. It is certainly a daily tactic, in the sense given by De Certeau, and a
‘moral disposition of the everyday’ in Zigon’s sense. Hayat felt an inclination
for a particular group, in this case a charismatic Islamist organisation with
strong support in working class neighbourhoods, but her initial tendency
was to avoid any open aﬃliation. The step which led her from ‘ﬂanking the
wall’ to ‘take to downtown’, and later on to a more active role within the
Movement, was made possible, once again, by joining other ‘neighbours’
with whom she experienced the possibility of trespassing the usual social
and spatial boundaries. Signiﬁcantly, the word commonly used by our interlo-
cutors to allude to demonstrations, the same used by Hayat – khrej, ‘going out’
– conveys this sense of physical and psychological opening. The notion of
sha‘b (the people) – whose will was aﬃrmed through the famous slogan
‘ash-sha‘b yurīd… ’ (the people want…) – works as a vehicle for a powerful
collective identiﬁcation. The awareness that one is right reinforces the
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determination and preﬁgures new possibilities with respect to the roles within
the group of origin.
Mohammed grew up in a working-class neighbourhood in a small Moroc-
can town, where his family moved shortly before his birth. His household’s
political orientation was mildly conservative and his father was a member
of a traditional brotherhood. Mohammed was not particularly interested in
politics and deems his early life to have been rather ‘normal’. On 20 February
he was 17 years old and declared on Facebook his intention to ‘stay home
playing Playstation’. He considered that he ‘had nothing to do with the Move-
ment’, that it was against the King and aimed at ‘destroying the system’. Even
today, Mohammed is not completely aware of what made him change of
mind. He recalls he had a chat over coﬀee with two classmates who convinced
him to attend a meeting, at which he did not understand most of the topics
that were addressed. Yet, he was ‘surprised by young people who were good-
mannered, educated, and knew what they were talking about’. Inspired by
their example, he felt he wanted to ‘turn into a person who understands
things diﬀerently’. He repeatedly emphasises this sense of personal diﬀeren-
tiation, with respect to his family, but even more in relation to the conformist
way of seeing society and politics. He took a while before confessing to his
parents his militancy, but he feels his relationship with them markedly
improved thereafter. He assertively maintains that being part of the Move-
ment was ‘a superb experience’ that changed him, including the direction
of his studies (see the next section).
A signiﬁcant continuity between family and activism emerges in many but,
signiﬁcantly, not all of our interlocutors’ life stories. The family has a funda-
mental role, even if not deterministic, in conveying an ethical orientation
toward the world and a broad or speciﬁc political vision. While this obser-
vation might verge on truism, we can still observe the quality of this trans-
mission and the way in which family orientation is reshaped by new
historical conditions.
Kamal hails from a household composed of activists who made their ﬁrsts
steps into politics in the 1970s, among the ranks of the Socialist Union of
Popular Forces (USFP), and then joined the Socialist Democratic Vanguard
Party (PADS). During childhood and early adolescence, Kamal found it hard
to understand his parents’ commitment, which kept them intensely busy
and had even led his father to prison on one occasion. His political awareness
rose at the summer camps organised by the Moroccan Association of Human
Rights (AMDH), which he attended initially as an opportunity to spend time
with other kids. As time passed, he felt more and more comfortable taking
the ﬂoor on issues they were used to debating at home: ‘the crisis of edu-
cation, unemployment, the condition of public health, corruption and crony-
ism, the separation of powers, the monarchy’. Logically enough, he feels his
involvement within the Movement from the outset was the natural
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continuation of his political socialisation. And yet, he considers that, despite
pushing him to attend summer camps, his parents’ imprinting on his world-
view has been less inﬂuential than that of his peers – proof of which can be
found in the fact that his brothers and sisters are not politically active. In
addition, he maintains that the Movement is ‘a space of participation, much
more open and free’ than the formal ways pursued by his parents, mostly
through party politics.
Interestingly, Younes, who is from a family largely aﬃliated to the Islamist
group Al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsān, also feels the need to underline his personal choice
in relation to politics, stating repeatedly that he was left free to form his own
ideas within the household. Yet, he acknowledges that his whole family took
part to the rallies organised by the Movement in Spring 2011, and that they
shared the same views concerning the situation of the country and the
need for an Islamist turn in Morocco. He states that he has been ‘always inter-
ested in politics’, ever since he watched the news with his father and listened
to the grown-ups discussing social and political issues. Very early – he says at
13 – he read some of Hassan Al-Banna’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s
pamphlets he found at home and approached a Moroccan Brotherhood-
inspired group, Al-Tawhīd wa al-Islāh. Right after 20 February, after the
groups’s declaration of allegiance to ‘the system’, he abandoned Al-Tawhīd
wa al-Islāh in order to formally join ‘the Jamā‘a’, the name used by militants
for Al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsān. As a committed representative of the organisation,
Younes, who was only 14 at the time, worked to establish a branch of the
20 February Movement in high schools, the ‘Movement of the students’
(Haraka al-Talmadiyya). After initial reluctance, Younes’s father encouraged
him to take part in demonstrations and push the Jamā‘a’s orientation at the
Movement’s meetings, a mandate that caused recurrent conﬂict with the
members of other political groups. Allegedly, this had the eﬀect of bolstering
Younes’s political conviction. Six years after the events, Younes is more active
than ever, being personally committed to the radical project expressed by the
Jamā‘a: its ‘political and educational’ goals, its ‘organizational capacity’, its
long-term strategic thought aimed at preparing the ground for the establish-
ment of a new khilāfa (‘caliphate’). In particular, he stresses the ‘ethical behav-
iour’ of its members, who ‘were always in the ﬁrst row’ and whose
commitment ‘was not enfeebled by threats and detention’. He personally
suﬀered police violence and detention for his active role in the demon-
strations supporting the Hirak, the movement that originated in the Rif after
the death of Muhsin Fikri (Lefèvre 2017; Wolf 2018), and is now convinced
that the time is not right for revolution, but ‘a patient work of sowing’ must
be undertaken with a view to securing a better future. He conﬁdes that
‘before’ he was too direct, impulsive and reckless, exposing himself to risks
and even considering death as a possibility, whereas now he agrees that
society must be led toward change through the patient work of ‘education’.
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 11
With this goal in mind, he matriculated in Political Science and plans to apply
for a grant oﬀered by an Islamist organisation to complete his studies in
Turkey. He aspires to become a university professor and to join the professors’
union in order to bring about his political view within the category. He
qualiﬁes this mission as a form of jihād, which, he observes, ‘cannot be only
directed frontally against the system’.
Well beyond what he is willing to admit, Younes – not unlike Kamal – is
enacting a family mandate, assimilated from his childhood and ratiﬁed in
the early days of the revolt when his father used to call him ‘his crown
prince’. Nonetheless, Younes seems to have exceeded his parents in terms
of ideology and militancy, turning his political posture into a life choice, a
movement in the proper sense of the term and one that is bound to last.
Similarly to Redwan, Sukaina, ‘Adil, Hayat, Mohammed and Kamal, for
Younes the process of political subjectivation is the result of involvement in
new ‘spaces of experience’ (Pleyers and Capitaine 2016), a series of situations
of relational learning in which new roles and forms of life are lived out and
gradually appropriated. Even when this occurs in continuity with primary
socialisation, it is also a process of personal diﬀerentiation. Ironically, unaware-
ness of causes and processes is a sign of eﬀectiveness and durability, inas-
much as subjectivation rests also on forms of embodiment that, as such,
are not immediately reached by reasoning. Through the enactment and
rehearsal of these new forms of being-in-relation, the subjective shift is con-
solidated and paves the way to new choices.
A structuring utopia and an unﬁnished project
In the introduction to his famous essay on hope and utopia, Ernst Bloch claims
that political imagination cannot be thought of without considering hope as
an orienting sense. For Bloch, ‘hope is not taken only as emotion […] but more
essentially as a directing act of cognitive kind’ (Bloch 1995, 12). Due to its
capacity to preﬁgure a desirable future, a ‘Not-Yet’, hope lays the foundations
of utopia, ‘in the new tenable sense of the forward dream, of anticipation in
general’ (Bloch 1995, 12). In a later section of the book, he deﬁnes a ‘concrete
utopia’ as the attitude to connect ‘dreams and life’ within a ‘Real-Possible’
(Bloch 1995, 145–146). Rather logically, Bloch observes that ‘all freedom
movements are guided by utopian aspirations’ (Bloch 1995, 7). In a later
essay, written again by straddling philosophy and literature, Bloch deﬁnes
utopia as the way ‘to ﬁnd it, to ﬁnd the right thing, for which it is worthy to
live, to be organised, and to have time’ (Bloch 2000, 3). A concrete utopia is
a perspective of change that is perceived at hand and, as such, is apt to organ-
ise hope around a possible future and give a direction to life, a way of pursu-
ing ‘a sense’ for what comes and for what one wants to become. Utopia
outlives failure and keeps alive hope by postponing its coming. Under
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adverse circumstances, deferment provides a powerful way of enduring the
present by anticipating alternative possibilities and making everyday life live-
able. Most likely, every human being needs a kind of utopian project, framed
either by religion, politics or economy (and frequently by all of these at once).
Its concreteness rests on a projection that is rendered plausible by putting
oneself in it, that is, by committing personally to the future.
The ‘forward dream’ is often shaped as a compensatory image of the
present, an overturning of the traits of one’s own perceived condition, a ‘revo-
lution’ in the literal sense of the term. Now, our interlocutors in Morocco recur-
rently qualify their social experience through notions like tkarfīs (suﬀering),
fasād (corruption, prevarication), hogra (abuse and humiliation), iħbaţ (frustra-
tion), żulm (injustice) and ‘unf (violence). Such terms, redundantly employed
to describe the sense of inequity in everyday life, remind us of the words of
those who aspire to emigrate (Elliot 2016; Menin 2016; Vacchiano 2018a,
2018b). They describe the perceived imbalance between aspirations and pos-
sibilities and the lack of conditions (żuruf) that qualify as ‘a decent life’ (‘aysh
karīm) in today’s world. Signiﬁcantly, the most renowned slogans chanted
across the Arab streets in 2011, and readapted by the Movement in
Morocco, echoed almost symmetrically these feelings.
The famous keywords ‘karāma, ħurriya, ‘adāla ijtima‘iyya’ (dignity, freedom
and social justice) were uttered in slogans and chants that were eﬀective in
breaking with individual helplessness and encompassing diﬀerent sensi-
tivities. For our interlocutors, ‘dignity’ is a speciﬁc reference to personal
value, respect and well-being (as in the expression ‘aysh karīm, ‘decent life’);
‘freedom’ is a claim for self-determination against state control over political
opinions and collective morality; ‘social justice’ refers to the inversion of social
imbalances and summarises a fairer society at large. Indeed, these notions are
suﬃciently ambiguous to create a semantic space of recognition in which
one’s experience can be projected: everybody is free to ﬁnd a personal way
of positioning themselves, and eventually – as in ‘Adil’s case – may be sur-
prised by recognising their feelings are shared by other people. The eﬃcacy
of such claims seems to exceed circumstances and bear long-lasting eﬀects.
For many of those who decided ‘to say no’ (an expression used by Bloch
but also commonly employed in many Arab countries: see also Schielke
2015), they turned into a kind of ‘structuring utopia’, one which shaped per-
sonal lifegoals and showed a way forward.
Redwan is now an active member of a recently established Moroccan NGO
for research and consultancy in the area of social participation. His movement
from mild curiosity to involvement has allowed him to increase his awareness
of social imbalances and to gain self-conﬁdence and a sense of initiative. He
believes that the 20 February Movement had broad ambitions in terms of
social and political change and that its tangible achievements have been
limited. Yet, he considers that the principle that people can rise and claim
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their rights was aﬃrmed once and for all. He keeps on hoping for a better
society and feels satisﬁed with working actively to pursue it. Today, Sukaina
works for an international NGO and militates in the same left-wing party to
which she drew close before the revolt. For her, the militancy within the Move-
ment has been ‘one of the best experiences in life’, and with the Movement
she feels she has lived out freedom and deep friendship. Whenever she
listens to the slogans chanted in demonstrations, she recognises the words
that the young people of the Movement imagined and wrote. She married
a comrade from the Movement and, although her parents are still deferential
toward ‘the system’, they have been gradually drawn closer to her political
views. ‘Adil has undertaken studies in Law and aims to become a lawyer
working with political detainees. He is currently an activist for the Moroccan
Association for Human Rights and sees his engagement as the unequivocal
continuation of his 2011 militancy. Admittedly, he chose to study Law
because the debates within the Movement demanded ‘a deep knowledge
of law or social sciences’, and because the majority of the young people
who inﬂuenced his views were students in Law. Hayat married an active
member of Al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsān, although the intensity of her militancy is still
ﬂuctuating. Mohammed is also enrolled in a MA programme in Law and
works as a volunteer in the same NGO as Redwan. He convincingly maintains
that ‘20 Febrair madrasa’ (‘20 February is a school’), an experience that ‘gener-
ated a big metamorphosis’ and that motivated him ‘to study to understand
things’. For his part, Kamal is now employed as a computer technician in a
state-owned company. During his militancy, he came to understand the
power of new media, and turned information technology into his job.
Although he estimates that things have not signiﬁcantly changed, he is con-
vinced that the Movement has opened new avenues by giving legitimacy to
the act of protesting. For this reason, since ‘many people still have nothing to
lose’, a new uprising is likely to occur in the future. If and when it does, he
plans to make himself useful by transmitting his technical skills to ‘a new gen-
eration of activists’. As for Younes, his plan is laid out clearly: he sees his ambi-
tion to become a professor in political science as a personal jihad (literally: ‘an
eﬀort’) that will enable him to pursue his ‘educational’ programme toward a
society informed by Islamic principles.
Other 20 February activists also undertook studies in social sciences and
philosophy, and today work in NGOs or human rights organisations or have
joined political parties. Some met their current partners through their acti-
vism, and almost all redeﬁned their personal roles and duties with regard to
the family. Thus, an intimate revolution accompanied the public engagement
of 2011 and beyond. Political subjectivation has both public and intimate
stakes, although the political signiﬁcance of each is not always the same.
The transition from ‘uprising’ to ‘activism’ is a passage from the quick erup-
tion of subversive passion and collective eﬀervescence to the strategic
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essentialism of a patient, often interstitial, daily struggle for spaces of move-
ment within the meshes of hegemony. Taking inspiration from Turner again,
it is a move between ‘communitas’ and ‘structure’, a ‘social drama’ in which
breach and crisis necessarily give way to redress and reintegration (Turner
1969, 1988; Thomassen 2012). Revolution is temporary by deﬁnition. In the
experience of our interlocutors, the return to the ordinariness of the ‘cold
time’ is well represented by the shift from ‘justice’ to ‘law’. Stepping from ‘adl
to ħaqq is doubtless a normalisation of the struggle and its insertion into a
domain of action supervised by the ruling power. Yet, it is also a way to preserve
the value of the ‘concrete utopia’ under other circumstances, keeping hope
alive, carving out conditional spaces of possibility in the present and postpon-
ing its full accomplishment to the future. Protracted activism in a regime of ordi-
nariness needs utopia in order to hold a direction. Add to this, in a largely
authoritarian state, evoking human rights (al-huqūq al-insān) and the rule of
law is to resort to a language that allows one to convey again, to diﬀerent audi-
ences, the call for dignity, freedom and social justice.
Conclusions: to be disidentiﬁed with power
In an insightful pamphlet written ‘on the spot’ in the Spring of 2011 (Benslama
2011), the Tunisian psychoanalyst Fethi Benslama questioned the ‘ﬂagrant’
(éclatants) events of his country in order to understand how it was that some-
thing deemed simply inconceivable a few months ago – nothing less than a
revolution – had ‘suddenly’ become possible. His reﬂection hinges on the
idea that the self-immolation of Tāriq Muhammad Al-Bou ‘Azizi provoked, in
the minds of his fellow citizens, a spark without previous references, a
process of radical rupture above all with themselves: ‘a new perception, […]
a sudden breaking of meaning, a […] dazzling desire that sets in motion
passion, language, representation’ (Benslama 2011, 16). For Benslama, this ‘ejec-
tion’, this displacement that takes one ‘out of oneself’, enabled a psychic separ-
ation from the structures of subjection and generated a new collective
identiﬁcation, on one side with the martyr and on the other side with ‘the
people’. For Benslama, this subjectivation, occurring in circumstances where
‘chance meets necessity’ (Benslama 2011, 33), is achieved through a powerful
emotional movement that breaks the consolidated structures of the imaginary
and opens up unexpected, potentially revolutionary, conﬁgurations.
It seems to us that this movement of ‘swerve’ (Rancière calls it ‘écart’) is the
condition of possibility for an ethical break that consents to question the
legitimacy of the ruling power and the resulting ‘voluntary servitude’. In
order to be properly political, however, this change of direction needs to be
ratiﬁed and shared in a collective environment, becoming a plausible
project, a ‘concrete utopia’, also for others. Only a form of collective organis-
ation – a party, a group or, under very speciﬁc conditions, a ‘multitude’ – can
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authorise and make eﬀective the passage from daily malaise, when people
resist injustice, to hope in a revolution.
In analysing this shift, we found a very speciﬁc combination of personal dis-
positions, historical circumstances, forms of collective identiﬁcation and
organised thought. The 20 February Movement in Morocco represented the
coalescence of these factors and became an environment in which individual
sensitivity could be turned into an organised project. It was, at the same time,
both a trigger for personal change and a result of it. Our interlocutors recount
this moment in their lives as a fundamental passage, an existential turning
point that ended up inﬂuencing their subsequent choices. In this sense, the
comparison with the ritual process is striking. This shows us that, even if it
is carried out in very speciﬁc circumstances, the act of ‘problematization’
has consequences that last well beyond the moment of its emergence:
‘breakdown’, in this case, did not seem to give way to the return to an
unreﬂected everyday condition. Like any signiﬁcant experience, political
subjectivation prompt a metamorphosis in the way in which the individuals
position themselves with respect to the world. Yet, perhaps unlike any other
experience, it produces also a discourse on the world and a reﬂection on the
posture one assumes personally towards the power which is fostered by a
shared, structuring utopia. Therefore, even though the revolt has not kept
all its promises, at least some of its changes have come to stay. For many
of its protagonists, the Spring has not exhausted its potentialities and ‘the
long 2011’ is still running.
Notes
1. Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), IF/01002/2014/CP1239/CT0003.
2. Al-Wasīŧ min ajli ad-Dimukratiyya wa Huqūq al-Insān (The Mediator for Democ-
racy and Human Rights), Haraka 20 Fibrāir. Muĥawala ﬁ At-Tawthīqi (The 20 Feb-
ruary Movement. An Attempt of Documentation), Rabat, 2015.
3. For an exposition of convergences and divergences in considering subjectivity in
anthropology and psychoanalysis, see Moore (2007).
4. On the cyclical swing of ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ periods in Morocco see Bennani-Chraïbi
(1994).
5. Literally: ‘storehouse’. It is the term that designates the authority and its
agents in Morocco, alluding to the buildings where in-kind tributes were stored
in the past.
6. The vernacular term, common in the whole Maghreb and recently extended to
other Arab countries, used to refer to the humiliation, abuse and prevarication
committed by the authorities.
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